WHEAT ACREAGE SUPPLY RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES by Burt, Oscar R. & Worthington, Virginia E.
Wheat Acreage  Supply  Response  in the
United States
Oscar R. Burt and Virginia E. Worthington
The dynamic structure of wheat acreage  supply response is considerably more
complex than previous  studies have recognized.  The distributed lag response is  saw-
toothed in its pattern, which is believed to eminate from the influence  of summer
fallow  in crop  rotations in the Great Plains. The acreage  response elasticity estimate
for the Great Plains at mean price was  1.3,  and for the aggregate  U.S.  it was  1.5.  For
the United States, the proportion of long-run response  experienced  over the first five
years from an increment  to price was .24,  .44,  .70,  .95, and  .99.
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Quantification  of supply response  to price in
agricultural commodities has been a challenge
for agricultural economists  since the early days
of regression  analysis. In the post-World War
II period, difficulties have been particularly se-
vere because of the sporadic and ever-changing
government programs for the major commod-
ities such as corn and wheat. Yet, many areas
of research  in our profession  require quanti-
tative  measures  of supply response,  e.g.,  the
commodity  storage  models  so popular in the
late  1970s. Government programs, which his-
torically have been an obstacle to precise sta-
tistical  estimation  from  time-series  data,  re-
quire  good  estimates  of  supply  response  in
order to measure their effectiveness in meeting
policy makers'  goals.
Wheat  is  by  far the  most  important  food
crop grown in the United States, and only corn
and  soybeans  are  more valuable  field crops.
Obtaining  a reliable  quantitative  estimate  of
wheat  acreage  supply  response,  including  its
dynamic  structure,  is an important  and chal-
lenging  research  problem.  The  relatively  few
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periods without government controls, and the
frequent changes in the structure of these con-
trols, complicates an already difficult task. The
objective  of this study  is to estimate  empiri-
cally  this  dynamic  response  function  and  to
evaluate  carefully the robustness of the spec-
ification through the use of recursive residuals
and scrutinizing  the specification for any  sen-
sitive aspects (Leamer).
The approach  taken is relatively empirical,
in that elementary economic theory is used as
a guide to the specification but no rigid a priori
hypotheses  are  imposed.  The  model  is  for-
mulated  so that  a large  family of hypotheses
on specific  structure  are encompassed  within
the single framework, particularly with respect
to the dynamic response (Mizon).  Of course,
this general philosophy  is severely limited by
the few degrees  of freedom available in annual
time  series  under  changing  government  pro-
grams.
The next section examines some of the spe-
cial  problems  in  the  specification  of wheat
acreage response,  particularly  under dry land
farming conditions in the Great Plains which
introduce  complex  dynamic  considerations.
The empirical model is presented in the second
section, and the primary statistical results are
given in the third. In the fourth section, alter-
native  specifications  are  evaluated  to further
validate the model;  a brief summary and con-
clusions section  is given at the end.
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Modeling  Wheat Supply Response
The Nerlove partial  adjustment/adaptive  ex-
pectations model of supply behavior has dom-
inated  dynamic  specification  in  agricultural
supply studies (Nerlove). Eckstein recently de-
veloped  a rational expectations  model  which
is  observationally  equivalent  in  its  reduced
form  to the  Nerlove  model  (Eckstein  1984,
1985).  This theoretical  contribution  provides
insights into the idealized consistency which a
supply  model should have,  but it is not clear
how useful this simple model is for empirical
quantification.  Taylor's  results  on  stochastic
duality  theory  of the  firm  demonstrate  how
short-run supply and factor demand equations
will  contain  state  variables  associated  with
quasi-fixed  factors  of  production  (Taylor).
Therefore, a complete model of the firm's long-
run  output supply equation  would  contain  a
system of dynamic  equations to describe  the
firm's  investment  behavior  with  respect  to
quasi-fixed  factors,  but data are  rarely avail-
able  to model these investment equations.
The practical alternative is to recognize the
omission  of these  state  variables  and  try  to
allow  for their  effects through  a more general
distributed  lag  response  on  the  explanatory
variables included in the regression equations.
If  the latent state variables tend to change rath-
er smoothly  over time  in the aggregate  data
used for estimation, this approach should work
quite well,  especially  if the  state variables re-
spond primarily to the set of explanatory vari-
ables  needed in a static supply equation (out-
put  and  factor  prices).  Completely  ignoring
these latent state variables  and  focusing only
on price expectations as the source of dynamic
behavior  in supply  is likely  to  cause  serious
specification  errors  in the distributed  lag  re-
sponse.
In general, an important source of latent state
variables  is  the  dynamics  of crop  rotations
(Eckstein). The complementarity  in joint pro-
duction, such as with corn and soybeans in the
Corn Belt or wheat and barley in the Northern
Great Plains, comes from sequencing the crops
to control various pests (including weeds) and
improve soil structure and fertility. Typically,
expected net returns per acre from one of the
crops  in  the  rotation  is greater  than for  the
other, but the secondary crop is the next best
source  of income that will break the life cycle
of pests  on  the primary  crop.  If the  price  of
the primary crop rises,  farmers will temporar-
ily plant  more  acres of it relative  to the  sec-
ondary  crop,  but the resulting  increased pop-
ulation of pests  (or depleted  nutrients  in the
soil) will provide a large incentive to get more
acres into the secondary crop the following year.
Some of these effects may require a distributed
lag response in the explanatory variables, price
of the primary crop in particular,  and part of
the effects are likely to surface as negative au-
tocorrelation in the regression  residuals.
In the semiarid climate of the Great Plains,
summer fallow  plays  the same  role  as  a  sec-
ondary  crop as  described  above.  A year with
summer fallow is very effective  for weed con-
trol, especially perennials; it breaks the life cycle
of many crop diseases; soil moisture is stored
for the following  crop;  and various nutrients,
especially  nitrogen,  are released  with  the ac-
celerated decay of organic matter. Although all
income is sacrificed during the fallow year, the
variable costs are low compared to producing
a  crop.  Much  wheat  acreage  expansion  and
contraction  in the  Great Plains  is associated
with the relative  frequency of summer fallow,
especially in the climatic transition areas where
summer fallowing is a marginal practice.  Dur-
ing  policy control years,  increased  frequency
of summer fallow is an effective way for farmers
to meet the acreage diversion requirements and
increase average yields per acre.
Another  source  of latent  state  variables  is
the firm's capital stocks. It might be tempting
to assume  that  averaging across  firms  in ag-
gregate data would remove the need to allow
for changing  levels of capital  stocks.  The cy-
clical nature of livestock breeding stocks in the
aggregate is well known, but machinery capital
also tends  to fluctuate  widely  too. Purchases
are clustered in time because  farmers'  current
income levels influence  replacement  and new
purchase  decisions.  The  opportunity  cost  of
liquid assets is less during good times, and the
progressive income tax encourages more pur-
chases in high income years. Actual machinery
services available change more than the quan-
tity  of  stocks  would  suggest  because  newer
stocks  incorporate  later technology  and  thus
more input capacity per unit time.
The aggregate amount of  machinery services
available  is particularly  important  for wheat
acreage  response  in the Great Plains because
it imposes a constraint on farmers'  ability to
respond  opportunistically  to  fluctuations  in
prices. The large reserve of actual or potential
summer  fallow acres provides an unusual  op-
Burt and WorthingtonWestern Journal  of Agricultural Economics
portunity for quick  increases  or decreases  in
seeded  acreage  as  expected  returns  fluctuate
when machinery services are plentiful.
Another  major  source  of expanded  crop
acreage  in the Great Plains is rangeland,  and
wheat is the primary crop at the extensive mar-
gin. Asymmetries in the costs of such land use
changes  are  large because  it is difficult  to re-
establish livestock range.  This situation tends
to make wheat acreage changes at the extensive
margin occur relatively  slowly  in response  to
price fluctuations.
Several  conclusions  are apparent  from the
above  discussion  of latent  state  variables  in
wheat  acreage  response,  particularly  under  a
semiarid climate. First, aggregate data will not
be  available  to permit the  inclusion  of these
state variables directly in a regression equation
for  acreage  response.  But  even  if data  were
available,  the  model  would  need  to  be  ex-
panded  to include a behavioral  equation  for
each  state variable  which  conditioned  short-
run  response  or  else  one  could not  estimate
long-run acreage  response to wheat price.  Sec-
ond, the distributed  lag structure will need to
be estimated from the sample data. Care must
be exercised in any smoothing  of the lag  dis-
tribution because the influence of summer fal-
low  is  likely  to  yield  an  irregular  structure,
maybe exhibiting a sawtooth pattern.
In  regard to the synergetic  relationship  be-
tween the primary and secondary crops, acreage
response of the primary  crop  to price  of the
secondary  crop  might  very  well  be  positive
with a net substitution into or out of a third
crop (range in the Great Plains). Consequently,
it is  presumptuous  for researchers  to  deflate
price  of the primary  crop with that of an  al-
ternative crop which is frequently grown in the
same region.
In  using economic  theory  to guide  specifi-
cation of the acreage response regression equa-
tion, there should be a careful weighing of the
benefits of using a priori knowledge against the
consequences  of  imposing  a  too-restrictive
model dictated by the theory. Our static theory
of the firm is quite general,  but the dynamic
theory  available  tends  to be very  restrictive,
e.g.,  the recent model of Eckstein.  The speci-
fication problem is further removed from our
theory because at a given point in time aggre-
gate data reflect extreme heterogeneity in land
and climatic resources as well as firm size, fixed
stock of labor,  and capital resources.  This el-
ementary observation suggests that a good deal
of flexibility should be allowed in the empirical
model. It would seem naive to attempt a spec-
ification which was restrictive enough to par-
tition out a price expectations hypothesis sep-
arately from the effects of latent state variables
associated with production.
The  strategy used  in this  study  was  to let
static theory of the firm suggest a general struc-
ture for the implied equilibrium of  the dynam-
ic time-series regression equation. The dynam-
ic  structure  was  assumed  to be  an  unknown
distributed  lag  response  in  all  independent
variables  of the  regression.  Specifically,  the
static  model  has  wheat  acreage  as  a  general
function of wheat and alternative  crop prices,
prices of farm inputs, and government  policy
variables,  which  are defined  in the next  sec-
tion.
Empirical Model
The basic economic variables, functional form,
and dynamic  structure  are given  in the  next
subsection. Then a brief description of  the gov-
ernment program variables is given and their
role in the model is explained.  Additional de-
tail on the rationale and definitions of the pro-
gram variables  are  provided in the appendix
along  with  some generalizations  which  were
not statistically significant.
Economic Variables and Structure
A semilog  functional  form was  used to force
a declining  price  elasticity  (inversely propor-
tional to acreage), which would be expected as
a result  of the  finite  amount  of arable  land.
Commodity prices were deflated by the index
of prices paid by farmers for production items
(1977  base).  A general  rational  lag  approxi-
mation was used as a guide  to choosing a  dy-
namic specification.  The lag  structure  turned
out  to be  rather  irregular  at  lags  up  to  four
years and then declined geometrically at a rap-
id rate.
Acreage in year t refers to the calendar  year
in which harvest takes place for spring wheat
planted that spring and winter wheat planted
the previous fall. Separate price variables enter
the  acreage  response  equation  for September
in year t - 1  (March of  year t in North Dakota)
and  for  crop years  t  - 2,  t  - 3,  and  t  - 4;
these prices are the average received by farmers.
Crop  year  t  - 2 starts  in July of year t  - 2
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and ends with June of year t - 1. March price
in year  t is  used for  North  Dakota  because
most of the wheat acreage  is in spring  wheat.
September price is viewed  as the latest infor-
mation used by winter wheat farmers  to for-
mulate their price expectations  for the follow-
ing  harvest,  but  September  price  is  not
necessarily expected price per se because lagged
seasonal  prices  are  also  in the equation.  No
attempt is made to partition  out an  expected
price  formation mechanisms  from  the effects
of latent state variables  which might be mea-
sured by lagged prices.
State prices were weighted by production and
averaged  to  get  a  wheat  price  for the  Great
Plains. However,  the national price  was used
in the  evaluation  of alternative  crops-feed
grains  and  "feed  grains  and  hay"  price  in-
dices-because  the  close  substitution  among
feed grains for livestock feed  makes the cor-
relation in prices  among the components  ex-
tremely  high.  One  complication  with  wheat
acreage  response  is that one of the  most im-
portant  alternative  crops  is  forage  (livestock
range  in the Great Plains),  for which  a good
measure  of  price  is  wanting.  Therefore,  it
should be no surprise if  the price of  other crops
is not statistically  significant.
The  problem  of supply  response  measure-
ment from  prices  of alternative  crops  is  ex-
acerbated  by  the tendency  for  all  grain  (in-
cluding  wheat)  prices  to  move  in  the  same
direction,  especially  when  the  price  changes
are large.  Results reported  in such  studies as
this one with only one commodity price in the
equation must be interpreted according to the
structure of the data from which statistical es-
timation  was  done.  These  results  for  wheat
acreage would not be appropriate if there were
major shifts  in regional production  of the  al-
ternative crops or if  the relative price of wheat
to one  of the alternative  crops were to change
substantially from the range within the sample
data used here.  The static  ceteris paribus as-
sumption in the interpretation of an empirical
price elasticity must be relaxed;  instead of "all
other prices held constant," it is "all other prices
are following similar time paths relative to that
for wheat  as  existed  in the  sample  period."
This is a weak result, but all that the data base
can  support;  or put another way,  all that the
implicit experimental design matrix of the dy-
namic regression  can support.
The final model after empirically identifying
the distributed lag structure  is
(1) A,  =  f 0 +  3 1 0og SPt-, + 0210g  Pt-2
+  310g Pt 3 +  410og Pt-4
+  3 51og FP, 1 + (policy variable  terms)
+ XE(Atl)  +  Ut,
where  SP,  P, and FP are  September  wheat,
seasonal wheat,  and feed grain prices, respec-
tively; A  is acres of wheat seeded; and E(At_,)
is  the  lagged  expectation  of  the  regression
equation. This latter term imposes a geometric
lag  on all  explanatory  variables  in the equa-
tion. The {(3}  and X  are unknown parameters,
and  ut  is  the  disturbance  term which  is  as-
sumed to follow an autoregressive/moving  av-
erage (ARMA) process.
The a priori restrictions  on parameters sug-
gested by economic theory are (1 +  F2 +  f3  +
34  >  0 and  0  < X <  1. The  former implies  a
positive  long-run  acreage  response  to  wheat
price, while the latter yields a stable dynamic
response  equation.  The  sign  of (5 is  indeter-
minate for reasons discussed earlier in relation
to crop rotations.  The ARMA process for u, is
assumed stable and invertible in the moving-
average components.
In  an  equilibrium  state  where  commodity
prices  and  production  costs  have  been  con-
stant for an extended period and there are no
government  programs,  the expected  value of
the dynamic response in (1) reduces to (written
as a deterministic  equation):
(2)  A =  Yo  + 7ylog P  +  72log FP,
where 7, = (1 +  ,  +  2 +  +  43)/(1  - X) and 72
=  35/(1  - X). Wheat price denoted by P in the
steady  state  ignores  the  seasonal  variation
structure of September  price compared to the
crop-year  price.  If the  seasonality  were  mul-
tiplicative  (additive in logs),  it would  simply
make an adjustment to  yo.  The intercept is  yo
= (0o  + constant)/(l  - X),  where the constant
reflects  the "no  allotment  dummy  variable"
defined in table 1 as well as the seasonality for
September price.
Government Program Variables
Since the 1950s, federal wheat programs have
moved away from mandatory controls in favor
of voluntary provisions  relying on  economic
incentives  to  encourage  participation.  How-
ever, the overall intent of these programs-to
maintain prices above a certain lower limit or
floor and to minimize massive stockpiling  of
excess supplies-has remained constant. For a
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succinct  summary  of the  various  farm  pro-
grams for wheat, the reader is referred to Houck
et al.  Additional  detail  is  available  in  Had-
wiger.
Earlier quantitative studies used a variety of
approaches to model "policy variables"  to ac-
count  for the  influence  of government  pro-
grams  designed  to  control  planted  acreage
(Blakeslee; Garst and Miller; Hoffman; Houck
et al.; Lidman and Bawden; Morzuch, Weaver,
and Helmberger).  One popular device  for in-
corporating  policy  changes  with  a  minimum
of extra  explanatory  variables  is the  concept
of effective payment per bushel associated with
a  program  option,  such  as guaranteed  loans
and acreage diversions. This approach was first
applied  to wheat  acreage  by  Hoffman  at the
regional  level,  and  shortly after by Houck  et
al. at an aggregate  level for the United States.
The  method  used  by  Lidman  and  Bawden
stems  from the  same line  of thought,  but fo-
cuses on an expected price concept defined by
the  adaptive  expectations  mechanism  which
incorporates  the government  guaranteed  loan
rate jointly with market price last period.
An alternative method for modeling  policy
changes which  expends more  degrees of free-
dom was introduced by Garst and Miller. They
used a more complete set of program variables
in place of the effective payment variables used
by Hoffman and Houck et al.  But as noted by
Morzuch,  Weaver,  and Helmberger, their use
of actual  acres  diverted  from  wheat  through
the  diversion  and  set-aside  programs  raises
questions about joint dependencies  in the sta-
tistical model;  all  uses of acreage  are  simul-
taneously determined  in response to the mar-
ket  and  government  incentives.  Morzuch,
Weaver, and Helmberger partitioned the sam-
ple into marketing quota and nonquota years
under  the  hypothesis  that  the  quota  years
(1954-63) had such tight restrictions on acreage
that market price had essentially no influence
on plantings. They also included 1950 and 1964
in those years of no price response.
In this study, government  program features
are broken into seven key variables which are
summarized in table 1. The allotment variable
represents  an  upper  bound  on  total  wheat
plantings  for program participants during the
years it was in effect.  This variable was  set at
zero in the years  when the allotment was not
in force, and a dummy variable was introduced
to allow  the intercept  to  shift  in these  years
(third column, table 1). The national allotment
variable  was  used in the Great  Plains model
because  adjustments  in this  variable were  so
nearly proportional among farms.
The  marketing  quota  dummy  allows  for a
shift  in the intercept during  the tight restric-
tions on marketings and acreage during  1954-
63. Two separate methods were used and com-
pared.  The first,  which  will be  referred to  as
the  "quota  model,"  assigned  zero  to  wheat
prices during the quota years and used the mar-
keting quota dummy variable in table  1  to ad-
just the intercept. In the distributed lag frame-
work used, all  lagged prices  during the quota
years  were  set  at zero,  but  the  lagged  prices
associated  with  the  quota  period  which  ap-
peared in the regression equation immediately
after the quota period were not set at zero. The
second  method,  called the  "dummy model,"
simply  assigned  ten individual  year dummy
variables during the quota years and made no
adjustment in prices.  The separate year dum-
my variables completely remove the influence
of the quota years on parameter  estimates ex-
cept for parameters  in the disturbance  struc-
ture.
The acreage reserve years under the Soil Bank
program (1956-58) were treated as unique with
a separate dummy varible  for each year. Par-
ticipation rates were low during 1956 and 1958,
which suggested that these years might not be
significant.  The  conservation  reserve  portion
of the  Soil Bank program was not specifically
entered as  a separate  variable.
Marketing certificate payments were intend-
ed  to provide  an incentive  for program  par-
ticipation between  1963 and  1973.  In reality,
they  served  as  an  increment  to  the  average
price  received  by wheat  farmers.  Results  are
reported later which support  this conclusion.
The average certificate value per bushel  of all
wheat produced in the previous crop year was
added  to the  September  price  of wheat  and
added to the contemporaneous crop year price.
The 49¢ deficiency payment per bushel of pro-
duction  in  1977  was  treated  as  a marketing
certificate  payment.
A  diversion  dummy  variable  was  intro-
duced for the years  1962-66  and  1969-70  to
shift  the  intercept  on  the  acreage  equation
downward,  thus  reflecting  the  incentives  of
program  provisions  during  those  years.  The
set-aside dummy variable in table  1 performs
the same role for  1971-73, and it is assumed
that the deficiency payment/set-aside program
in  1977 could be approximated  by treating it
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Table  1.  Annual Federal Wheat Program Variables
Certif.
Allotment  No  Mktg.  Acreage Resere  Payments  Diver-  Set-
Year  (1000  acres)  Allotment  Quota  1956  1957  1958  ($/bu.)  siond  Asidee
1945  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1946  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1947  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1948  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1949  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
1950  72,800  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1951  72,800a  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1952  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1953  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1954  62,800  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
1955  55,800  0  1  0  0  0  0
1956  55,000  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0
1957  55,000  0  1  1  0  0  0  0
1958  55,000  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0
1959  55,000  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
1960  55,000  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0
1961  55,000  0  1  0  0  0  0  0
1962  49,500  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0
1963  55,000  0  1  0  0  0  .18  1  0
1964  53,200  O  0  0  0  0  .43  1  0
1965  53,300  0  0  0  0  0  .44  1  0
1966  51,500  0  0  0  0  0  .59  1  0
1967  68,200  0  0  0  0  0  .48  0  0
1968  59,300  0  0  0  0  0  .55  0  0
1969  51,600  0  0  0  0  0  .65  1  0
1970  45,500  0  0  0  0  0  .75  1  0
1971  33,670b  .26c  0  0  0  0  .54  0  1
1972  0  1  0  0  0  0  .47  0  1
1973  0  1  0  0  0  0  .21  0  1
1974  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1975  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1976  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
1977  1  0  0  0  0  049f  0  lf
aAllotment rescinded after winter wheat planted. Value  represents  1950 allotment total.
b Proportion of winter wheat to all wheat plantings  (74%) multiplied by the  1970 allotment total.
cProportion  of spring wheat to all wheat plantings.
d Diversion (1962-66,  1969-70).
e Set-aside (1971-73,  1977).
The 1977  diversion program  and payment per bushel  was treated like  the earlier  set-aside and certificate payment.
the same as the set-aside program in the earlier
period.
Attempts to model farm programs after 1977
were an unequivocal failure.  The authors sus-
pect that the rapid increase in total crop acreage
from  1979 to  1981  was largely in response to
anticipated government programs or those al-
ready in effect.  The new programs let farmers
reestablish  acreage  bases  instead  of locking
them  in at historic allotments.  Opportunities
were abundant  to rachet normal crop acreage
(NCA) upward by staying  out of the program
for a year and planting  large  acreages.  There
would appear to have been strong convictions
among  farmers  that  the  government  would
eventually  be  imposing  strong  measures  to
control production,  and,  based on past expe-
riences,  a large  NCA  would  provide  an  op-
portunity to collect lucrative government sub-
sidies.
With  the many  changes  which  have  been
taking place in the programs and the complex
interrelationships  of the policy and economic
variables  (see Evans),  combined  with sophis-
ticated  strategies  used by  farmers,  the mod-
eling task might be infeasible except for indi-
vidual year dummy variables to remove these
years  from  the  sample.  Since these  years  are
on the end of the sample, that would be equiv-
alent to truncating  the sample  as was done in
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Table  2.  Wheat Acreage  Response  Equations (1949-77)
United States  Great Plains
Equation No.:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Intercept  -33,546  -19,954  -24,718  -34,613  -33,609  -31,232  -31,575
(6,826)  (7,221)  (4,417)  (3,192)  (1,904)  (2,779)  (1,375)
Diversion  -4,695  -9,116  -8,539  -3,221  -3,334  -4,065  -4,006
(979)  (1,387)  (769)  (589)  (385)  (812)  (642)
Set-aside  -4,287  -7,225  -7,026
(1,463)  (1,263)  (755)
No-allotment  25,469  17,190  17,202  12,807  11,577  9,639  9,500
(4,724)  (4,975)  (2,893)  (3,086)  (2,595)  (3,066)  (2,274)
Mkt. quota  63,822  55,424  54,743
(7,057)  (3,956)  (3,179)
Allotment  .326  .190  .184  .168  .151  .130  .127
(.074)  (.077)  (.044)  (.049)  (.042)  (.048)  (.035)
Sept. Price,_l  15,390  13,564  14,191  12,797  12,809  13,187  13,548
(2,571)  (2,149)  (1,791)  (1,596)  (1,685)  (1,374)  (1,291)
Price,_2  8,302  9,206  11,005  6,825  7,227  5,134  5,134
(3,365)  (2,853)  (2,262)  (2,186)  (2,467)  (2,017)  (1,837)
Pricet_3  17,661  21,385  21,533  12,104  11,721  12,334  12,699
(3,819)  (3,104)  (3,032)  (2,416)  (2,567)  (2,188)  (2,007)
Price_4,  7,486  8,547  9,337  10,284  9,965  8,635  8,413
(2,944)  (2,632)  (1,844)  (1,980)  (1,839)  (1,892)  (1,373)
Geometric lag  .150  .247  .260  .322  .317
(.049)  (.038)  (.024)  (.052)  (.032)
MA(1)  .830  .860
(.235)  (.244)
AR(1)  -. 600
(.151)
Adjusted R
2 .984  .987  .983  .986  .984  .990  .988
Std. error est.  1,370  1,212  766  908  693  748  471
Degrees  freedom  15  9  7  16  15  9  8
Long-run  price
elasticity  .92  .84  .90  1.26  1.27  1.31  1.31
Notes:  Prices are in natural  logarithms  and "Pricei" is the  season  average  for  crop year  i,  where i denotes calendar  year of harvest.
Equations  containing the marketing  quota dummy  variable have  the prices set equal to zero  during the quota  years (1954-63).  These
same equations  (1, 4, and 5) contain  dummy variables  for years  1950 and  1956-57.  The remaining equations  (2, 3, 6, and  7) contain
dummy  variables for the quota years  1954-63 and for  1950. Adjusted R-squared  is the  square of the sample correlation between the
dependent  variable and a predicted  value which excludes  the information  content of the estimated  AR or MA disturbance structure.
Standard errors  of regression coefficients are in  parentheses.  Wheat acreage is  in units of 1,000. The 1949-77 sample average  acreages
are 62,627 and 44,401  for the United States and Great Plains, respectively.
this study. One of the models described above
treats the  period of marketing  quotas (1954-
63) this same way.
Statistical Results
Acreage response  equations are given in table
2 for the United States and Great Plains.  Eight
states  comprise  the  Great  Plains:  Montana,
North Dakota,  South  Dakota,  Colorado,  Ne-
braska,  Kansas,  Oklahoma,  and  Texas.  Two
different  price  indices  for  alternative  crops
which might affect planted wheat acreage were
tested in various regression equations. Neither
the  price  index  for  feed grains  nor  the  com-
posite  of feed  grains  and  hay  showed  much
significance  in any of the equations. Typically
the t-ratio  was less the  1.0 in absolute value,
and the regression coefficient was positive. The
equations  in table  2  exclude any price  for al-
ternate crops.
Numbers  in  parentheses  are  asymptotic
standard errors;  see the  first footnote  in table
2 for an explanation of the R-squared measure
as well as the notation for prices. Note that the
prices  are in natural logarithms, but acres are
not logged. Reported elasticities  are for mean
acreages  during the sample period,  1949-77.
The  quota models in table  2 are  identified
by the presence  of the marketing  quota vari-
able,  and the other equations  are the dummy
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Table 3.  Individual State Regression  Equations,  1949-77
Stan-
Geomet-  dard  Long-
Sept.  Season  Season  Season  ric Lag  Error  Run
Price  Price  Price  Price  Param-  Esti-  Elas-  Average
State  t-  1  t-  2  t-3  t-4  eter  mate  R
2 ticity  Acreage
N.  Dakotaa  3,519  396  2,877  365  .379  347  .964  1.40  8,230
(554)  (708)  (865)  (553)  (.061)
Montana  2,165  826  569  2,284  .573  224  .916  2.85  4,780
(621)  (602)  (679)  (430)  (.080)
S. Dakota  1,500  -116  1,659  1,025  .238  112  .976  1.90  2,802
(304)  (291)  (286)  (237)  (.068)
Nebraska  807  952  641  1,063  .462  137  .945  1.86  3,451
(287)  (414)  (465)  (362)  (.071)
Colorado  786  -265  920  427  .583  209  .783  1.50  2,983
(450)  (593)  (658)  (467)  (.088)
Kansas  2,158  3,103  2,556  3,826  .121  399  .957  1.13  11,675
(679)  (903)  (991)  (855)  (.066)
Oklahomab  991  753  1,721  1,133  .222  266  .939  1.03  5,729
(476)  (568)  (548)  (630)  (.105)
Texasb  1,238  1,239  968  826  .305  312  .910  1.29  4,751
(648)  (933)  (858)  (970)  (.140)
Note:  Prices are in natural logarithms and several  agricultural program and dummy variables were in the equations (see text for details).
Degrees of freedom  are equal to  fifteen,  and standard errors  of coefficients  are in parentheses.
a September  price  is replaced by  March  price in year  t.  A large outlier in the residuals  for  1971  is dummied  out because  only spring
wheat producers  had time to respond to a late policy announcement.
b Estimated in  first differences,  but the R2 is with respect to levels for comparison  with other states.
model with individual year dummies for 1954-
63.  Coefficients  on the  individual  year dum-
mies are not given in table 2 to save  space.
The disturbance  structure was  explored  by
performing  an ARMA  analysis  on the resid-
uals from the equation specified with the clas-
sic  properties  for the disturbance.  The  first-
order moving-average,  MA(1), disturbance was
estimated  by a two-step procedure  where  the
parameter estimate  from the residual analysis
was taken as the estimate; the reasons for this
method are given in (Burt). The standard errors
in  the  MA(1)  parameter  estimates  were  cal-
culated indirectly from a likelihood ratio t-sta-
tistic. The autoregressive AR(1), parameter for
the third equation  was  also estimated by the
two-step procedure  because the estimate  was
implausibly large  in absolute  value by Coch-
rane-Orcutt iteration. The small number of de-
grees of freedom in this equation might be the
main problem.
In both the United States and Great Plains
equations, results are given for both the classic
and AR(1)  or MA(1)  disturbances,  except for
the quota  model for the United States  where
the  classic  properties  appeared  adequate.
Equations  (1) and  (2)  for the  United  States
provide  a direct comparison  of the quota and
dummy  models.  Note that the geometric  lag
in the first equation is significant but very small
in its effect, while lack of significance  led to its
deletion in the second and third equations. All
three  of the  U.S.  equations  yield  point  esti-
mates of respective parameters which are quite
close  to  one another  considering  the number
of degrees of freedom involved. The price vari-
ables  in  particular  have  coefficients  which
change little from one model to the other, and
the long-run price elasticities are nearly equal.
The  four  equations  for  the  Great  Plains
[equations  (4)-(7)]  show  even  less  variation
across different specifications. The disturbance
structure  and  geometric  lag  parameter  esti-
mates  are nearly the same  for the quota  and
dummy models.  Likewise,  the long-run price
elasticities are nearly equal.
Separate individual state equations were es-
timated for the Great Plains to test for possible
spurious  statistical results caused  by aggrega-
tion.  Summary  results  from  these  equations
are  reported  in  table  3 for the  quota  model
[comparable  to equations  (4)  and (5) in table
2]. In general, the statistical precision  is much
less than for the aggregate, but the same struc-
ture  appears  to hold across  each  of the indi-
vidual states.  In particular,  the long-run  elas-
ticities  are  all  greater  than  unity  and  their
acreage weighted average is 1.50, which is quite
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close to the estimates in table 2 of about  1.30.
Results  for the  dummy model  (not reported)
gave  a  weighted  average  elasticity  of  1.57,
which is also close for this type of comparison.
There  were obvious specification  problems
for Oklahoma  and  Texas  which  required  es-
timation in first differences to get a stable struc-
ture  on the disturbance  term;  possibly omis-
sion of cotton price  for these states is part of
the problem. Nevertheless,  point estimates of
the  price  coefficients  are  consistent  with  the
aggregate equations. The lagged price structure
for Kansas  mimics  that for the Great Plains
very closely and with good statistical precision.
North Dakota was estimated using March price
in  place  of September  price  because  most of
the acreage is in spring wheat. All states except
Oklahoma and Texas tended to have negative
autocorrelation in the residuals, but the results
in table  3 are for a classic  disturbance  speci-
fication.
Both  Montana  and  South  Dakota  contain
substantial  acreages  of spring  wheat,  which
suggests that March price is a relevant variable
in these states as well as September price. Sep-
arate  equations  for  spring  and  winter  wheat
were  estimated  for  these  two  states,  but  the
results were  not as  plausible  as an  aggregate
model  using  September  price.  Disaggregated
models  in  dryland  farming  introduce  more
random  variation  in plantings  which  are  as-
sociated with localized weather conditions.
An  analysis  of the region  east of the Great
Plains (not reported here)  suggested  a change
in structure between  1949-54 which appeared
as  a gradual  increase  in  acreage  response  to
price.  It  is possible  that  development  of the
practice  of double  cropping  wheat  with  soy-
beans in the Southeast was responsible for this
change in structure. This result prompted rees-
timation of the U.S.  acreage  equation  for the
period 1954-77. Results from the quota model
[counterpart of equation  (1)  in table 2]  are,
(3) At =  -73,008  - 4,084X 1 +  83X2 +  25,768X3
(15,431)  (895)  (2,057)  (4,600)
+  99,906X4 +  .355X5 + 21,499SP,_,
(14,495)  (.075)  (3,243)
+  14,920Price_  2 + 19,684Price,_3
(3,980)  (3,596)
+  18,531Price,_4 +  .176A,_,
(4,778)  (.049)
where X,  ... , X5 are the first five ordered vari-
ables in table 2, and the price variables  are as
defined earlier. The Durbin-Watson statistic is
2.58,  which  implies  some  negative  autocor-
relation in the sample residuals; but estimation
with an AR(1) disturbance gave essentially the
same point estimates and precision.
The  degrees  of freedom  in  (3) are  13;  the
adjusted R-squared  is  .979,  and  the SEE is
1,223.  Precision  on the  price  parameter  esti-
mates in (3) is not as good as equation  (1) in
table 2,  but the point  estimates  are larger  in
(3). Long-run elasticities at the acreage sample
means in  1954-77 and  1949-77  are  1.53  and
1.45,  respectively,  much larger than reported
in table 2 for the United States. The long-run
elasticity  estimate  given  in  (Burt,  Koo,  and
Dudley) for the period 1961-76 was 1.44, very
close to the above results for 1954-77.
Distributed lag patterns are given in table 4
for the United States  and  Great Plains.  The
lag coefficients are normalized relative to long-
run response. The response  measured in acres
(thousands) can be obtained by multiplication
of the  coefficients  by the last row of table  4.
These acreage responses are equal to OA,,j+/(log
Pt), i.e., the net change in acreage j  years after
the  once-and-for-all  increment  to  the  loga-
rithm of wheat  price.  The partial  derivative
with respect to price, instead of its logarithm,
is inversely proportional to the level of price;
but for  a given  price,  the relative  weights  in
table  4 would be unchanged.  The  U.S. equa-
tion for 1949-77 (first equation in table 4) gives
a noticeably  different  distributed  lag in com-
parison with the 1954-77 sample (last column,
table 4). The distributed lags of  the Great Plains
(1949-77  sample) and  the  United  States  for
1954-77 are nearly identical.
Tests of Specifications
Special Wheat Payments
As explained earlier, the per bushel certificate
payments in  1963-73 and the deficiency pay-
ment in 1977  were added  to wheat prices. To
test whether  these  payments  were,  in  effect,
like an addition to prices received by farmers,
an equation was estimated for the Great Plains
with  the certificate  payment  as an additional
independent  variable  and lagged the same  as
prices  which  include the payment.  This pro-
vides a nested hypothesis framework for which
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the  F-statistic  was  1.05,  with  four  and  five
degrees  of freedom, which  is  marginally  sig-
nificant at about the  40% level.  These results
were  for the  dummy  model,  equation  (6)  in
table 2.
A similar test was performed using the quota
model, equation (4) in table 2, but it was  not
exactly nested.  The object was to remove the
payments  from prices and get a separate esti-
mate for net effects of the payments for direct
comparison to those for prices. Therefore, cer-
tificate payments were not added to prices and
the payments were entered as before; but prices
were in logarithms, which makes the test only
approximate.  Point  estimates  of  the  coeffi-
cients  on the payment  variables  were  6,434,
-349, 4,478,  and 4,330 with standard errors
of about 2,000. These are for payments in the
crop years t - 1 to t - 4. Only the coefficient
for t  - 2  is a violation of the general pattern
of the coefficients  on prices, and this anomaly
was traced to the influence  of one data point.
The F-statistic calculated as if the hypothesis
were nested was .35,  with five and twelve de-
grees  of freedom.  In  summary,  there is  little
reason  to question  the  addition of certificate
payments  to prices  to  represent  the  effect  of
the  certificate  and  deficiency  payment  pro-
grams.
Futures Prices
The use of wheat futures price in place of Sep-
tember price at planting time for winter wheat
was  tested by  replacing  September  with  the
futures price.  The Great Plains was used once
again, for this comparison because  results for
this region seemed to be the most reliable. The
quota model was used, equation (4) in table 2.
With the futures  price, the  standard error of
the  estimate  (SEE)  increased  from  908  to
1,277,  and  the adjusted R-squared  fell  from
.986  to .972.
These  results  are  consistent  with the fore-
casting  performance  of both  price  variables.
Season average price is defined on a marketing
year (not production)  so that year t is July of
calendar year t through June  of calendar year
t  +  1. Therefore,  in the notation used earlier,
Pricet can be forecast by either SPt-_  (Septem-
ber price  the  fall  the  wheat is planted)  or  by
Ft  which denotes the futures price defined ear-
lier (fall  settle close prices for July contracts).
Note that Pt  1 is not observable in the  fall
Table  4.  Distributed  Lag  Response  to  the
Logarithm of Price
Source:  Table  1  Text
Equation  No.:  1  5  3
Order of Lag  (U.S.)  (G.P.)  (U.S.)
0  .268  .227  .237
1  .185  .187  .207
2  .335  .257  .254
3  .181  .243  .249
4  .027  .063  .044
5  .004  .016  .008
6  .001  .004  .001
7  0  .001  0
8  0  0  0
Average lag  1.53  1.80  1.69
Long-run response  57,458  56,381  90,575
Note:  The  coefficients  are acreage  response relative  to the long-
run response.
since only about two months of the marketing
year  t  - 1 have been  experienced.  Neverthe-
less, the forecast equations were specified with
an AR(1) disturbance to get more efficiency in
estimation  and more  reliable  standard errors
on parameter  estimates.  The fitted equations
over the sample period  1949-77 are
(4)  Pt= 1.55  + 2.23D 7 3
(.52)  (.33)
2 = .673,
(5) Pt= 1.92  +  1.92D73
(.75)  (.41)
R2  =  .623,
+  .497SP,_  +  .789Ut,_
(.106)  (.116)
SEE = .386,
+ .394F, +  .767t,_-
(.169)  (.121)
SEE = .486,
where  ti-,  is the calculated lagged disturbance,
D,3 is a dummy variable  for  1973  which was
a large outlier,  and R2 excludes the contribu-
tion of zUtl. The R2, SEE, and relative  t-ratios
for SPt-_  and Ft  all suggest that September price
received  by farmers  is superior to the futures
price  in forecasting  season  average  price  re-
ceived by wheat farmers for their crop.
The relatively  poor performance  of the  fu-
tures price  in the  acreage  equations  could  be
from the greater forecasting  information  con-
tained in the September price and/or from the
source  of information  chosen  by  farmers.  If
farmers  focus  most  of their  attention  on fall
prices  quoted in their local  areas,  the futures
price  is largely irrelevant  except insofar  as  it
shapes spot prices  at local  markets,  and tem-
poral variation in the basis could be a problem.
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Recursive Residual Analysis
Equations  for  the  United  States  and  Great
Plains  were  tested  for  specification  problems
using sequential  post sample  conditional pre-
dictions.  The quota  model was  used because
it preserves more  degrees of freedom.
Equation (1) in table 2 was used for analysis
of the U.S.  model.  The  1949-77  sample  was
sequentially reduced by dropping the latest year
until  the  1949-72  sample;  then  a  degree  of
feedom  problem  and  lack  of  precision  en-
couraged  extending the  sample back to  1945
although  these  early years  did not appear  to
show  a  completely  consistent  response  with
the 1949-77 period.  The last sample used was
1945-66,  which provided a total of eleven ob-
servations for one-year-ahead  prediction. The
root mean square error is 3,200 (thousands of
acres) and the bias is 519. The former is quite
consistent  with  the  theoretically  calculated
standard errors of prediction over the sample,
and the bias is clearly within  common statis-
tical variation.  A formal statistical test on the
entire  set of standardized  residuals  (see  Har-
vey, p.  156) gave a t-statistic equal to .17 with
10  degrees  of freedom.  The  two-  and  three-
year ahead prediction root mean square errors
are 3,309 and 2,894, respectively,  with biases
-85  and -355. In fact,  the post-sample pre-
diction performance is good out to seven years.
However,  1977 is always predicted with a re-
sidual  larger  in absolute value  than twice  its
standard error.
The same procedure was used on the Great
Plains model using equation (4) in table 2. The
results are more favorable  than for the United
States in that the largest ratio of a residual to
its standard error was  1.89  in absolute  value.
This includes all predictions out to seven years.
The summary  measures  of root mean  square
error and bias were also most encouraging  for
this specification.
Summary and Conclusions
The dynamic structure of wheat acreage supply
response  is considerably  more  complex  than
previous studies have recognized.  The distrib-
uted lag response is quite protracted and is not
well  approximated  by the commonly applied
geometric  lag.  It  is conjectured  that this un-
usual lag structure emanates from latent state
variables in the production process with crop
rotations playing  an important  role.  It is be-
lieved that the practice  of summer fallow  in
the  Great  Plains  tends  to  give  this  choppy
lagged response.
Long-run  wheat  supply  response  is  quite
elastic for the aggregate  United States, around
1.5 for the period 1954-77 and.90 using 1949-
77 as the  sample. This much divergence  with
the choice of samples  suggests  some aggrega-
tion problems in the U.S. equation. In the Great
Plains  the  elasticity  is  about  1.3;  results  for
this  region  were  very  robust  to  alternative
specifications and sample periods. These  elas-
ticities are  considerably  larger than  previous
studies have found but quite compatible  with
estimates for other major wheat producing na-
tions  like  Canada,  Australia,  and  Argentina
(see Schmitz and Bawden, p. 25).
For the United States, the proportion of long-
run response experienced  after a finite number
of periods  is .24,  .44,  .70,  .95,  and  .99  over
the  first  through  fifth  consecutive  years,  re-
spectively.  These  proportions  for intermedi-
ate-run responses  are nearly the same for the
Great Plains.
The  functional  form  used  for  acreage  re-
sponse to price was semilog with prices in log-
arithms.  As a consequence,  price  elasticity  is
inversely proportional to the associated acreage
level.  The  larger  long-run  elasticity  reported
above for the United States is  1.5 at the mean
acreage (1954-77) but at the lowest and highest
acreages  in the sample, the elasticities  are  1.9
and  1.1,  respectively.
The authors'  lack of success in introducing
post-1977 data into the sample to give a com-
prehensive  model  for the entire  period  after
1949 may be viewed by some as casting serious
doubt on the results reported here. At the close
of this research  effort, data through  1983 were
being used, which is only six additional years
into the nation's new experiment in farm pol-
icy.  Possibly  a better  perspective  can  be  ob-
tained as we reflect back on a longer period of
experience  with these  new programs.  Just as
the  marketing  quota  years  (1954-63)  have
largely defied integration into a comprehensive
acreage response equation,  so may a period in
the late  1970s and early  1980s.
[Received November 1987; final revision
received April 1988.]
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Annual state wheat price data through 1972 were obtained
from Agricultural  Statistics, and later price data were taken
from annual summaries of Agricultural  Prices. Feed grain,
feed grain and hay, and prices  paid for production items
indices were collected from the 1980  annual summary of
Agricultural  Prices. September state wheat prices were tak-
en  from  September  issues  (1943-58)  and  annual  sum-
maries (1959-77) of Agricultural  Prices; likewise, for March
prices  in North  Dakota.  State  seeded acreage  data were
taken from Agricultural Statistics and annual summaries
of Crop Production. All of these sources are published by
the U.S. Department  of Agriculture.
Elaboration  of Policy Variables
Although the allotment for 1951  was eventually rescinded,
this was not done until well after the winter crop had been
planted.  Therefore,  1951 was treated as an allotment year,
and the  1950  allotment was used.  In  1971  the allotment
program  was modified  so that it no longer restricted total
plantings.  However,  this  was  not announced  until  after
winter wheat had been seeded. Following Garst and Miller,
a special allotment total was calculated as the proportion
of winter  wheat to  all  wheat plantings  (74%)  multiplied
by the  1970  allotment which  represented  the allotment
level  for winter wheat  program participants.  The no-al-
lotment dummy variable  in table  1 was then modified to
reflect the needed change in the intercept,  i.e., the normal
value of zero  for an  allotment year was replaced  by  the
fraction spring wheat comprised of total wheat acres (.26).
This intercept  shift  variable  is assigned  a value  of one
during no-allotment  years.
The no-allotment dummy variable was partitioned into
two separate  variables  to test whether  the nearly twenty
years of controls had changed  the structure of acreage re-
sponses starting in  1972  after the allotment variable was
no longer relevant.  There was little statistical evidence  of
any  change in structure.
The assumption  of zero response  to prices  during the
quota  years was  tested  statistically  by introducing  vari-
ables defined as the product of the quota dummy and the
lagged  prices,  but  these  interaction  variables  were  very
weak  statistically  and  insignificant  as  a group.  Another
such  interaction  variable  defined  as  the  product  of the
quota dummy and the acreage  allotment was tested,  but
it was also insignificant.
Because the period of the Soil Bank program (1956-58)
occurred within that for the marketing quota, the dummy
model with separate year dummies accounted for this spe-
cial program.  For the quota model,  1956 and  1957  indi-
vidual year dummies were used and none was needed for
1958 based on the  statistical results.  The lack  of signifi-
cance  for  1958  might  have  been  expected  because  the
acreage reserve program rules were much more restrictive
compared  to  1956-57. In particular,  summer fallow land
no  longer  qualified  for  the  reserve  and  farmers  had  to
reduce their total harvested crop  acreage  by the number
of acres  put in  reserve,  thus discouraging  farmers  from
participation  in the program.
The  marketing  certificate  payment  is  the  sum  of the
domestic  and export  payments to program participants.
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